Gazprom Offshore Wind Initiatives for 2025: Key Projects, Strategies and Partnerships
Gazprom and Offshore Wind: A Strategy of Deliberate Distance
Industry Adoption: A Tale of Two Strategies
From 2021 to 2024, Gazprom’s approach to the clean energy transition was characterized by observation rather than direct participation in offshore wind. The company’s activities remained firmly rooted in its core natural gas business, with large capital allocations, such as the increased 2024 investment program of $16.85 billion, reinforcing this focus. While partners like Wintershall Dea (via BASF) explored commercial-scale offshore wind, and projects like the BLOW 5 MW floating demonstrator emerged in Gazprom’s Black Sea operational theater, Gazprom itself remained on the sidelines. Its foray into alternative energy was limited to exploratory projects in hydrogen, such as the Sakhalin blue hydrogen initiative and investigations into white hydrogen. This period reveals a strategy of leveraging existing assets and partnerships to hedge into hydrogen while consciously avoiding capital-intensive entry into the offshore wind sector.
The period from January 2025 to today marks a significant inflection point, not in Gazprom’s adoption of offshore wind, but in its strategic divergence from competitors. While the market saw major players like JERA and bp launch JERA Nex bp, a 50/50 joint venture to manage a global offshore wind portfolio, Gazprom doubled down on its fossil fuel strategy. Its high-profile partnerships in 2025 with Petrovietnam and the government of Mongolia are explicitly for enhancing oil and gas production and infrastructure, such as the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline. The only direct renewable energy signal from Gazprom is a 15-year PPA for UK solar, a notable but isolated diversification move. This contrast signals a clear threat: as global energy majors aggressively build commercial and technical capabilities in the rapidly scaling offshore wind sector, Gazprom risks being left behind, cementing its role as a traditional energy supplier in a decarbonizing world.
Table: Gazprom Strategic Investments and Capital Allocation
Partner / Project | Time Frame | Details and Strategic Purpose | Source |
---|---|---|---|
Gazprom Investment Program | 2024 | Increased 2024 investment program to 1.64 trillion rubles ($16.85 billion), a 4% increase, signaling a continued focus on traditional energy sources over renewables. | Reuters |
Gazprom Share Purchase | Sep 13, 2023 | Board meeting to consider purchasing company shares, an internal investment that directs capital away from external diversification like offshore wind. | Reuters |
Table: Gazprom Strategic Partnerships
Partner / Project | Time Frame | Details and Strategic Purpose | Source |
---|---|---|---|
Government of Mongolia | Recent (2025) | Signed a memorandum of cooperation to enhance collaboration in the oil and gas sector, specifically related to the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline. | OilPrice.com |
Petrovietnam | May 19, 2025 | Discussed cooperation for infill drilling to maintain stable gas production at the Hai Thach and Moc Tinh gas fields offshore Vietnam. | Offshore Energy |
Canadian Solar | Date Unspecified (2025 context) | Signed a 15-year power purchase agreement (PPA) for UK solar projects, representing a small, low-risk entry into renewable energy purchasing, not development. | Solar Power Portal |
Rosatom | Sep 7, 2021 | Teamed up for the Sakhalin blue hydrogen project, indicating an interest in low-carbon fuels derived from its core natural gas assets, rather than renewable electricity. | Offshore Energy |
GASCADE, Gasunie, RWE, Shell | Apr 27, 2021 | Mentioned in the context of the AquaDuctus project, which aims to transport green hydrogen from 10 GW of offshore wind. Gazprom is not a direct partner, highlighting how other majors are integrating offshore wind and hydrogen. | Global Energy Prize |
Geography: A Pivot to Asia for Gas, While Renewables Flourish Elsewhere
Between 2021 and 2024, Gazprom’s geographic focus remained on its legacy markets and infrastructure, primarily in Russia and Europe. Its alternative energy explorations, such as the Sakhalin blue hydrogen project, were located in Russia. Concurrently, offshore wind activity involving its partners or occurring in its operational vicinity was centered in Europe, such as BASF’s plan with RWE for a 2 GW wind farm in the German North Sea and the BLOW demonstrator in the Black Sea. This shows a geographic separation of strategies: Gazprom focused on its Russian gas and hydrogen potential, while its European partners pushed ahead with offshore wind in the North and Black Seas.
In 2025, a distinct geographic pivot emerged. Gazprom’s strategic actions shifted decisively towards Asia, with a gas pipeline MoU involving Mongolia and intensified gas drilling cooperation with Petrovietnam offshore Vietnam. This move secures future demand for its core product in growing Asian markets. In stark contrast, the major offshore wind developments highlighted in the data occurred without Gazprom’s involvement. The JERA Nex bp venture is global, and a significant cross-border wind power deal is taking shape between Vietnam, Singapore, and Malaysia. This geographic divergence is critical: while Europe and Southeast Asia become hotspots for large-scale offshore wind development and cross-border clean energy trade, Gazprom is using those same regions (like Vietnam) to entrench its fossil fuel business, creating a potential long-term risk as these nations accelerate their own renewable energy transitions.
Technology Maturity: Watching from the Shore
In the 2021-2024 period, the provided data shows the offshore wind sector progressing from demonstration to commercial scale. The BLOW project represents the demonstration phase for floating technology in the Black Sea, while the 2 GW offshore wind farm planned by BASF and RWE signals a mature, commercially scalable application. During this time, Gazprom’s technological focus was on mature gas exploration and production technologies, alongside early-stage exploration of blue and white hydrogen production. The company was a spectator to the maturation of offshore wind technology, choosing instead to invest in optimizing its existing technological base and exploring hydrogen as a parallel, non-competitive energy vector.
From 2025 onward, the data validates that offshore wind has entered a global scaling phase. The formation of JERA Nex bp to manage a 13GW portfolio is a clear signal of industrial-scale commercialization and operation. Meanwhile, Gazprom’s 2025 technological activities, such as infill drilling plans with Petrovietnam, represent mature, incremental improvements in its legacy fossil fuel extraction business. There is no evidence of Gazprom acquiring or developing offshore wind technology. Its only step into renewables is a PPA for UK solar—a mature, de-risked technology that requires no development from Gazprom. This widening technological gap indicates that for Gazprom, the market timing for offshore wind has likely passed for a leadership position; any future entry would be as a late follower, facing competitors with years of established operational expertise.
Table: Gazprom SWOT Analysis on Offshore Wind Strategy
SWOT Category | 2021 – 2024 | 2025 – Today | What Changed / Resolved / Validated |
---|---|---|---|
Strengths | Dominance in the natural gas market and existing partnerships with energy players like Wintershall Dea provide significant capital and influence. | Deepened O&G partnerships in key Asian markets, such as the MoU with Mongolia for Power of Siberia 2 and drilling plans with Petrovietnam in Vietnam. | The company validated its ability to leverage its core strength in gas to secure long-term Asian partnerships, reinforcing its primary business focus. |
Weaknesses | No direct investments or stated partnerships in offshore wind projects. Exploration is focused on blue/white hydrogen, not renewable electricity generation. | Apparent lack of engagement in offshore wind continues while competitors like bp and JERA launch a global joint venture (JERA Nex bp) for the sector. | The strategic weakness in renewables became more pronounced. While competitors scaled their wind operations, Gazprom’s only renewable move was a solar PPA, highlighting a capability and strategic gap. |
Opportunities | Partners like BASF (via Wintershall Dea) are involved in offshore wind, presenting a potential pathway for collaboration or knowledge transfer. | The 15-year PPA with Canadian Solar for UK solar projects signals an initial, low-risk appetite for diversifying its energy portfolio through offtake agreements. | Gazprom validated a model for entering renewables via PPAs, a capital-light approach. However, it chose not to apply this model to offshore wind, instead focusing on gas infrastructure. |
Threats | Geopolitical factors and a growing focus in Europe on reducing reliance on Russian gas drive investment into alternatives like the AquaDuctus green hydrogen pipeline powered by offshore wind. | Competitors and nations are actively building cross-border renewable energy links (e.g., Singapore-Malaysia-Vietnam wind power deal) specifically to enhance energy security away from traditional suppliers. | The threat of displacement was validated. Competitors are not just building renewable assets but are creating new, international energy trade routes for clean power that bypass Gazprom’s gas network. |
Forward-Looking Insights: The Great Divergence
The most recent data from 2025 signals a clear and accelerating divergence between Gazprom and other global energy majors. While its competitors are building integrated renewable energy businesses, with offshore wind as a cornerstone, Gazprom is strategically retrenching into its role as a primary producer of natural gas, with a distinct pivot to secure long-term demand in Asia. The partnerships with Mongolia and Vietnam are not peripheral activities; they are core to its future.
Looking ahead, market actors should not expect a sudden pivot from Gazprom into offshore wind development. The signals to watch are more subtle. First, monitor if the UK solar PPA is replicated elsewhere. This would indicate a broader strategy of using PPAs to green its portfolio without direct investment risk. Second, observe the competitive landscape for its hydrogen ambitions. As green hydrogen from offshore wind (like the AquaDuctus concept) becomes more viable, it will directly challenge Gazprom’s blue and white hydrogen strategy. For now, Gazprom’s path is set: a bet on the longevity of natural gas in Asia, while the offshore wind revolution scales globally without it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is Gazprom investing in offshore wind energy?
No, the analysis indicates that Gazprom has deliberately avoided direct investment in offshore wind. Instead, it has focused its capital on its core natural gas business, as seen with its $16.85 billion investment program for 2024 and exploratory projects in blue and white hydrogen.
How does Gazprom’s strategy compare to its competitors?
Gazprom’s strategy is one of divergence. While competitors like bp and JERA are creating joint ventures to build and manage global offshore wind portfolios, Gazprom is doubling down on its fossil fuel business, with high-profile partnerships in Mongolia and Vietnam to enhance gas production and infrastructure.
Has Gazprom made any investments in renewable energy?
Gazprom’s only direct renewable energy signal is a 15-year Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) for UK solar projects. The report notes this is a small, low-risk diversification move involving purchasing power, not developing renewable assets itself, and contrasts with the large-scale development activities of its peers.
Why is Gazprom focusing on partnerships in Asia?
Gazprom’s recent partnerships with Mongolia (for the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline) and Vietnam (for gas drilling) represent a distinct geographic pivot to Asia. This strategy aims to secure future long-term demand for its core product, natural gas, in growing Asian markets as its traditional European markets focus more on renewables.
Will Gazprom enter the offshore wind market in the future?
The analysis suggests a sudden pivot into offshore wind development is unlikely. The company is retrenching into its role as a gas producer. Any future steps into renewables are more likely to follow the model of its UK solar PPA—using power purchase agreements to add green energy to its portfolio without the risk of direct investment and development.
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